Stat geeks who are berried in saber metrics just don't understand that a player can't instantly change things like a better launch angle, simply because the numbers say they should!
Rog -- Perhaps you would benefit from reading more, Boly. Here is an excerpt from Fan Graphs yesterday:
Wallace compared the swing and approach of each batter to a fingerprint, something to be massaged at the edges but never undermined by the organization.
On the player-development side, accessing the individual is the most important part, says Alex Eckelman, assistant director of player development for the Cleveland Indians. “The key to adjustments for players is making them easily digestible,” Eckelman told me. For him, Haase is an easy case because he has an “outstanding work ethic” and “engages with the analytical side of the game in a productive way.”
Because individual players’ approaches are as diverse as snowflakes, adjustments must be similarly varied. In July, Haase talked about what he did to improve his launch angle. “This offseason I got to work with HitTrax, which measures your exit velocity and launch angle,” said the catcher.
At first glance, one might suppose that increasing the launch angle on batted balls requires a mere adjustment of bat path to eliminate a flat plane. However, for Haase, elevating the baseball was also about timing. Said Wallace: “We have always liked his swing mechanics, so there have not been concerns there. He has implemented a few different stance widths and leg kicks throughout the process, but the end goal has always been to improve his timing, strike-zone discipline, and approach. We knew whenever he starts to get in his launch position on time and consistently, the success will be there.” Indeed, Haase’s issue in creating loft consistently was not the path of the bat but rather the timing of contact in the bat path.
Interestingly, as far as Wallace was concerned, the goal for Haase was never specifically an improved launch angle. “I am not aware of any conversation from player development that addressed his launch angle,” said Wallace. “We’ve always known if he is on time and swings at pitches in his zone, the power/launch angle will be there.” It was Haase, on his own, who focused on the adjustments to launch angle while doing work with HitTrax in the offseason.
By focusing on narrowing a target swing zone and improved timing, Haase significantly improved his launch angle without having to undergo a massive mechanical overhaul. His case suggests that there are different ways to achieve launch-angle improvement.
A working answer to the second question posed above is foreshadowed by the responses to the first. Alex Eckelman emphasized that “using analytics in development is based on whether or not they can be digested by the player.” If a player can’t properly digest information, it will only serve to hinder his progress.
This is about catching prospect Eric Haase, who increased his fly balls this season from 43% to 52% and his isolated power (slugging percentage minus batting average) from .230 (good) to .315 (excellent). Remarkably, he also decreased his percentage of infield fly balls by nearly half. In other words, he found a way to get more loft while cutting DOWN significantly on times he got too MUCH loft.
The article concludes with:
There will come a time when information like launch angle and exit velocity are more fully integrated into development. For now, though, players like Haase, who are progressive in engaging with this data, will have an advantage in development. The Indians have found an impressive feel for how to integrate information without allowing it to undermine other developmental goals. In this field, minor leaguers like Haase are empowering themselves using data presented either by the team or publicly available research.
The article talks about the importance of the player himself and of his hitting coach (or in Haase's case his AA manager). Here is some more:
Dave Wallace, who coached Haase with the Double-A Akron Rubberducks in 2016 and won Baseball America’s Minor League Manager of the Year Award that same year, noted the importance of individuality in each player’s swing and approach: “Eric Haase’s plan is different than Greg Allen’s, whose is different than [Francisco] Mejia’s. No doubt, organizational philosophies are important and frequently discussed, but in a way that aligns with the player’s current needs and future goals.” Wallace compared the swing and approach of each batter to a fingerprint, something to be massaged at the edges but never undermined by the organization.
On the player-development side, accessing the individual is the most important part, says Alex Eckelman, assistant director of player development for the Cleveland Indians. “The key to adjustments for players is making them easily digestible,” Eckelman told me. For him, Haase is an easy case because he has an “outstanding work ethic” and “engages with the analytical side of the game in a productive way.”
Because individual players’ approaches are as diverse as snowflakes, adjustments must be similarly varied. In July, Haase talked about what he did to improve his launch angle. “This offseason I got to work with HitTrax, which measures your exit velocity and launch angle,” said the catcher.
At first glance, one might suppose that increasing the launch angle on batted balls requires a mere adjustment of bat path to eliminate a flat plane. However, for Haase, elevating the baseball was also about timing. Said Wallace: “We have always liked his swing mechanics, so there have not been concerns there. He has implemented a few different stance widths and leg kicks throughout the process, but the end goal has always been to improve his timing, strike-zone discipline, and approach. We knew whenever he starts to get in his launch position on time and consistently, the success will be there.” Indeed, Haase’s issue in creating loft consistently was not the path of the bat but rather the timing of contact in the bat path.
I sometimes wonder how smart people can come to such different conclusions. In some cases, such as this one I believe, it is because sometimes we simply don't have enough information. It is a reason why I study the game from watching games to reading about it to actually analyzing players based in part on what I have learned.
While some feel that using analytics demonstrates how someone doesn't understand the basic game and how it's played, I strongly believe it enhances the things we learned all the way from when we were kids and the players were literally bigger than (our own) life.
If a "stats geek" indicates it is easy to change launch angle, he's wrong. I haven't seen that, and in fact this article -- which I wasn't looking for but simply came across -- shows a "stats geek" who believes that is NOT the case and instead makes a case for the complexities, coordination and understanding it does take.
This is the second time in just a few days that I have randomly come across something relating directly to a topic we were discussing here.
My suggestion is to read more about analytics. Fan Graphs is a fine place to start. Baseball Prospectus. Beyond the Box Score. Scores of others. I can't see how when one knows more about and better understands analytics, he won't realize they can combine with scouting to provide better information than either alone.
At least that's what the 30 big league teams believe. And it's something that 20 years ago none of them truly understood. As they have learned more, they have realized the benefits of analytics.
I like Richie. My guess however is that I know more about baseball than he knows about analytics. Which makes his criticism of them clearly far from something that "HAS LONG NEEDED TO BE SAID about Sabermetrics."
I rarely criticize a manager's decision, since I realize there are many ways of looking at a situation and each situation is in its own way unique. I was thinking the other day about Bruce Bochy's failure IMO to use his hottest reliever (Will Smith) to close out the Cubs in Game 4 of the NLDS a year ago. Smith wound up needing Tommy John surgery this spring, so perhaps there were things Bruce knew that I wasn't privy to.
That is one reason I rarely criticize managerial decisions in the first place. While I understand the overall percentages of some moves such as sacrificing, I also realize -- and Don has said this many times -- that each situation can be different. As they say, the same but different!
I can often identify a strategy I think is better than the one that was actually used. But I can also build the argument as to what the manager may have been thinking when he made his decision. And I nearly always realize he may have information I don't have.
It comes from a different sport, but on Sunday former linebacker Chris Speilman said that anticipation can help overcome a lack of speed. It is true in baseball as well.
Positioning is one such form of anticipation. Positioning has never been as good as it is now. And while minor positioning was done before analytics, it is analytics that has provided clear evidence of how over-shifts can take hits away.
I didn't see it myself, but Jon Miller talked a week ago about how the Padres saw that D.J. Lemahieu -- last year's NL batting leader -- almost always went the other way when he hit a fly ball. They used a defense against him in which they over-shifted their outfield in much the same way the infield is often over-shifted. Apparently the left fielder lined up in what was part of center field. Lemahieu was unable to take advantage of the over-shift.
One reason teams use the over-shift is to get the batter thinking about it. It is to their advantage if they can distract the batter's concentration.
I have recommended this before, but if you want to learn how analytics might be applied to the ball field, read "The Only Rule Is It Has to Work: Our Wild Experiment Building a New Kind of Baseball Team." It gives some insight local to the Bay Area as to how analytics can be used in baseball.
If we are going to criticize something, we should know as much about it as those who defend it. Otherwise, how can we be confident our opinion is correct?
They say the best way to win a debate is to prepare your opponent's argument. The biggest problem with that approach is that it takes a LOT of work. But it puts one in an excellent position to make an informed judgment.
I haven't come across anyone -- "stats geek" or otherwise -- who knows much of anything about baseball and thinks that adjustments -- no matter how simple they may look from the outside -- are easy to make. If they did so, they would be speaking from ignorance.
And ignorance is precisely the position from which many -- possibly including Rich Aurila -- criticize analytics. I have found that the more I have learned about them, the more important I realize they can be.
It worked for Billy Beane. Want to know why it doesn't work so well for him anymore? Because the other teams now have their own sophisticated analytics departments, and Billy has lost much of his competitive advantage.
By the way, Billy wasn't a very good player at the major league level, but he did play major league ball, which is something most of us can't say. He was a good enough player that he was drafted #23 overall in the 1980 draft.
Billy knew most of the stuff we know about major league baseball -- and more. It was when he essentially combined analytics with scouting that he gained his big advantage, allowing him to field some very good teams despite having a VERY low budget.
Now virtually every team realized that combining analytics with scouting is better than either one is individually. That's why much of Billy's advantage has disappeared.
It has disappeared because the other teams have gotten SMARTER in how they do their business. Richie and some here on this board can put down analytics, but in doing so, they are going against the flow of the major league teams themselves.
Somehow as the teams themselves have learned more about analytics, they have used them more and more. It is my sense that if Richie and some here learned more about the subject, they too would realize its benefits.
Or perhaps our board knows more about baseball than the teams themselves. Despite having played only at a lower level, they believe they know more than the teams.
Oh, wait. That is one of the arguments they use against sabermetricians.
You can't have your cake and eat it too, which by the way is the proper way to make that statement, and is part of how the Unabomber was caught.
Speaking of public enemies -- and one in the Bay Area at that -- some might want to read the book "The Most Dangerous Animal of All," a book written by a guy who while trying to find his natural father, makes a strong argument that his father was in fact the Zodiac Killer. My son pointed out to me that he had come across the book's publicity on the internet. He asked me if I knew the author, being fairly sure I did.
And in fact that was the case. He (the son, not the Zodiac Killer) and I worked somewhat closely together for several years. After I read the book, I called Gary Stewart and caught up on old times. In fact, I should call him again.
I digress from baseball, but only to show the importance of reading in learning about a subject. Although the book I cited isn't particularly well-written, I think those familar with the Zodiac Killer will find it rather fascinating. I suspect it is yet another book available at the public library. I know for fact it is available on Amazon, as I believe is Boly's book.
And if one wants to learn about baseball analytics, Fan Graphs is a nice place to start. If one has followed it, he has seen that while Pablo Sandoval's hard-hit rate with the Red Sox offered some hope, it has fallen off badly as a Giant, resulting in much the same result as his apparently more unlucky hitting with the Sox.
My estimate is that while Pablo hit the ball hard 39% of the time as a member of the Red Sox, he has hit the ball hard only about 23% of the time as a Giant. Sadly, though Pablo appears to have had more hitting luck with the Giants, his true batting (hitting the ball hard) looks to have been much worse with the Giants. No wonder his average as a Giant this season has been even lower than as a member of the Sox.
Analytics helps to explain why there was at least some reason to believe Pablo might be successful in his return to the Giants. And why he hasn't been. (It's as simple as that he hasn't been hitting the ball hard nearly as often.)
Of course, watching him not be able to hit the high pitch (despite swing at it if it is anywhere close to the strike zone) or outside offerings, and not having a clue when batting right-handed might have helped too!
As we have seen, analytics also helps us see when a player is developing into a platoon player. It shows us that not only is a batter's career average important, but its trend, as well. It's amazing that both Pablo and Denard Span began their major league careers by hitting southpaws better than right-handers. Clearly that is no longer the case.
Boly and Randy know a lot about baseball, but they missed that one. It wasn't that the numbers lied, but that in Boly's case he didn't fully know them, and in Randy's case he either didn't know them, ignored them, or didn't understand them.
In Randy's defense, the Giants themselves made the same mistake. Unless they wanted to make it appear they strongly wanted to re-sign Pablo, when they actually didn't. But I think they simply made a mistake.
I'm pretty sure their analytical side of the organization didn't want to re-sign Pablo. This is one case where it appears the analytical side of the organization knew more than the scouting side.
To make a play on words, if the Giants had moved their computer key over one letter and scoured the situation instead of scouting it, they might not have come so close to making a horrible decision.
This one actually illustrates the point well. To scour means "to search very carefully and thoroughly through an area." The Giants scouted Pablo every day. But clearly they didn't scour him. Maybe there was too much to scour!
Pablo at $600,000 per season was a great gamble. Pablo at $95 million over five years wasn't even close to being one.
Read more:
sfgiantsmessageboard.proboards.com/thread/4062/aurilia-sabermetrics#ixzz4sRui47CzRead more:
sfgiantsmessageboard.proboards.com/thread/4062/aurilia-sabermetrics#ixzz4sRpQpGGr