"An unemotional, Rational Way of Doing Things"

[klaiggeb]

Look at Snider in his prime, Roger, and his offensive numbers were every bit as good as Mickey and Willie.

He was no slouch defensively, either.

IMHO, not as good as either, but I'm looking through prejudiced eyes that are influenced by looking backwards and into the past.

At the time... at the time... the three were really, really close.

[Islandboagie]

Moneyball is a joke.


Rog -- The joke's on you, Boagie. Moneyball is about finding undervalued assets, and that's a joke only when jokes are undervalued.

Boagie- I understand the concept, but the A's weren't successful because they signed Scott Hattenburg. They were successful because of the stud players they drafted, anyone who thinks otherwise is an idiot.

I didn't read the book, but I saw the movie. The movie hardly mentions Chavez or Tejada, who carried the offense. They hardly mention Hudson, Zito or Mulder, who led the pitching staff. It's a good story, infact, I liked the movie. I'm not a fan of Brad Pitt, I think he's overrated, but he was good in that movie. It was a well acted movie overall, but I dont think it accurately tells the story of WHY the A's were good. In the movie they portrayed the scouting department as a bunch of out of touch old white guys that have no place in the modern era of baseball. Which has led people, like Zaidi, to believe they can build a competitive team by focusing on getting lucky with long shot scrap heap players.

Last I heard, you haven't seen the movie or read the book, so maybe you should do that before you lecture people on it's message.

[rog]

At the time... at the time... the three were really, really close.


Rog -- You're right. Duke's prime was from 1953 to 1956, and he was exceptional at that time. In those four seasons Duke finished #3, #4, #2 and #10 in the MVP voting, and he was at least that good.

Of the trio, I believe that as highly as Mickey is regarded, he's the underrated one of the three. His 1956 Triple Crown season was one of the all-time great seasons. It is ironic that one of the things that made Mickey so brilliant -- his ability to lead the American League in walks five times -- kept down his counting numbers (home runs and RBI's) and while those figures were still extremely impressive, he didn't get the explosive credit he would have received had he walked less often and propped up the numbers that were considered more important in those days.

When you've got a hitter like Mickey who doesn't make many outs, you've got a hitter who because he increases his teammates' opportunities, does indeed make his teammates better -- or at least look better.




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[rog]

Boagie -- Last I heard, you haven't seen the movie or read the book, so maybe you should do that before you lecture people on it's message.


Rog -- You make a good point here, Boagie, but what is more important than either having read the book or having seen the movie is UNDERSTANDING Moneyball. Here is what Wikipedia says about it:


The central premise of Moneyball is that the collective wisdom of baseball insiders (including players, managers, coaches, scouts, and the front office) over the past century is subjective and often flawed. Statistics such as stolen bases, runs batted in, and batting average, typically used to gauge players, are relics of a 19th-century view of the game and the statistics available at that time. Before sabermetrics was introduced to baseball, teams were dependent on the skills of their scouts to find and evaluate players. Scouts are experienced in the sport, usually having been players or coaches.[1] The book argues that the Oakland A's' front office took advantage of more analytical gauges of player performance to field a team that could better compete against richer competitors in Major League Baseball (MLB).

Rigorous statistical analysis had demonstrated that on-base percentage and slugging percentage are better indicators of offensive success, and the A's became convinced that these qualities were cheaper to obtain on the open market than more historically valued qualities such as speed and contact. These observations often flew in the face of conventional baseball wisdom and the beliefs of many baseball scouts and executives.

By re-evaluating their strategy in this way, the 2002 Athletics, with approximately $44 million in salary, were competitive with larger market teams such as the New York Yankees, who spent over $125 million in payroll that season. Because of its smaller budget, Oakland had to find players undervalued by the market, and their system has proven itself thus far. The approach brought the A's to the playoffs in 2002 and 2003.

Lewis explored several themes in the book, such as insiders vs. outsiders (established traditionalists vs. upstart proponents of sabermetrics), the democratization of information causing a flattening of hierarchies, and "the ruthless drive for efficiency that capitalism demands". The book also touches on Oakland's underlying economic need to stay ahead of the curve; as other teams begin mirroring Beane's strategies to evaluate offensive talent, diminishing the Athletics' advantage, Oakland begins looking for other undervalued baseball skills, such as defensive capabilities.



When one undertstands Moneyball, it is far from a joke, and since most of us have limited resources available to spend, can be applied to many things in life. It's about value.





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